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Abstract
We consider a non-stochastic online learning approach to price financial options by modeling
the market dynamic as a repeated game between the nature (adversary) and the investor. We
demonstrate that such framework yields analogous structure as the Black-Scholes model, the
widely popular option pricing model in stochastic finance, for both European and American
options with convex payoffs. In the case of non-convex options, we construct approximate pricing
algorithms, and demonstrate that their efficiency can be analyzed through the introduction of
an artificial probability measure, in parallel to the so-called risk-neutral measure in the finance
literature, even though our framework is completely adversarial. Continuous-time convergence
results and extensions to incorporate price jumps are also presented.
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1 Introduction
In the financial market, an option is a contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation,
to buy or sell an underlying asset or instrument [23]. Consider the “vanilla” European call option
as an example. This contract is controlled by three parameters: the underlying asset S, say a stock
traded at the New York Stock Exchange, the strike price K, and the time to expiration T . A holder
of a European call option has the right to purchase the stock at time T at the prefixed strike price
K, regardless of the price of the stock at that time. Suppose that the stock price at time T , say
S(T ) (we shall abuse notation to denote S(t) as the price and S as the stock for convenience),
exceeds K, the holder will exert his/her right, and exercise the option. In the opposite event that
S(T ) submerges below K, a rational holder will initiate no action. Assuming the market is liquid,
since the holder who decides to exercise the option can sell the stock immediately at market price,
the payoff of this option at time T can be summarized as max{S(T )−K, 0}.
In general, any single-instrument European option has a payoff function g(S(T )) on an under-
lying asset S, depending on the terms of the contract. An American option, on the other hand,
gives the holder the right to exercise the option at any time before maturity.
The study of the fair prices of different options has not only been a core area in financial
economics, but is also important for market practitioners, given the gigantic volume of options
being traded at any trading day [19]. The area bloomed after the groundbreaking discovery of
Black and Scholes [11], which was later expanded by Merton [28]. In order to find the fair price of
an option, their main idea is to hedge against the movement of the underlying asset. Consider for
example a European call option. If the purchaser of the option, at time 0, chooses to concurrently
sell a portfolio that consists of the underlying asset and cash, in such a way that the portfolio’s
value at time T is exactly max{S(T )−K, 0}, then the portfolio must cost the same as the European
option; otherwise the option holder can construct an arbitrage that generates positive profit at no
downside risk, a scenario that is economically prohibited. In this way the fair price of the option is
exactly the value of the replicating portfolio. In the original work in [11], it was shown that a unique
price can be determined using this no-arbitrage principle if the underlying asset’s price follows a
geometric Brownian motion. Other variety of models may or may not succumb to a unique price.
See for example [15, 22] for comprehensive reviews of the literature.
In this paper we shall consider a non-stochastic online learning framework to price and hedge
options: We model option pricing as a repeated game between the trader of the option and the
“adversary” nature that controls the movement of stock price. The motivation is that probabilistic
description is not always accurate or easy to model in the financial market (as can be seen by the
numerous proposed stochastic models; see, e.g., [9]), which makes it intriguing to study the struc-
ture and computational capability if one uses a more conservative, namely adversarial, viewpoint.
Broadly speaking, our goal in this paper is to build a systematic framework in the non-stochastic
context that allows one to answer fundamental questions that have been around in the stochastic
finance community. Two such questions are:
Q1. What is the feature of a non-stochastic model that allows one to relate to the traditional
Black-Scholes model, the “Holy Grail” in option pricing?
Q2. Can we design efficient pricing algorithms under the non-stochastic framework and what
is the explicit hedging strategy implied by such algorithms?
We emphasize that in this paper we attempt to address the above two questions for general
options, i.e., both European and American, with either convex or non-convex payoffs. We acknowl-
edge that there exist a good number of related works previously, especially in the online learning
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literature. However, they all appear to be confined to somewhat limited settings. For example,
the work of Abernethy et al. [2] and Abernethy et al. [1] provide convergence results to Black-
Scholes and hedging strategies, but only for convex European options. DeMarzo et al. [17] and
more recently Gofer and Mansour [21] focus on the adaptive adversary setting and propose regret
minimization algorithms; however, their technique is also confined to convex payoff functions. The
same holds for the line of work in [29, 8, 7, 24], which is also limited to analysis on convex options.
Chen et al. [13] and Bandi and Bertsimas [6], on the other hand, consider general options (both
European and American), but they model the nature as oblivious. In view of these, we aim to
offer a non-stochastic model that allows analysis for a much wider range of settings than previously
considered.
Our work and contribution. We consider a model in which the stock price movement at
each step is restricted to a bounded deterministic set. While this model can be simpler than those
proposed in some of the previous works, we choose it for two reasons. First, this model, which is the
simplest non-stochastic model one can imagine, can be shown to exhibit, in certain cases, similar
behavior as the so-called binomial tree model (a discrete version of Black-Scholes). Secondly, this
simple model allows us to analyze options that are structurally difficult (such as non-convexity, and
American-type), and to propose efficient pricing algorithms.
Indeed, our main message in this paper is that, for a great generality of options, such a non-
stochastic framework offers both structural and algorithmic similarity to the classical Black-Scholes
framework, but requires analytical tools that appear to be new in the online learning literature. This
is explained by our two major contributions as follows:
1. We analyze an approximation algorithm to robustly price any options whose payoff function
is monotonic and Lipschitz continuous. While the algorithm itself is deterministic (because of the
non-stochastic problem nature), its analysis involves the construction of an “artificial” probability
measure, which dramatically tightens the bounds on its error estimates. This “artificial” measure,
resembling the so-called risk-neutral measure [22] commonly used to derive the Black-Scholes for-
mula, is the first of its kind to analyze any deterministic algorithm. This contribution appears in
Section 4.
2. We provide algorithmic and structural results to American option pricing, which can be
thought as an online game in which the adversary is allowed to withdraw. This withdrawal feature
is new in the online learning literature, and our formulation here gives the first natural problem
under such setting as well as the first non-trivial analysis. This contribution appears in Section 5.
Besides these two main contributions, in the Appendix we shall also show several extensions,
including: (1) We show that a continuous-time limit of our model converges to the Black-Scholes
model for convex options, and non-convergence to Black-Scholes for non-convex options. For the
latter case, the limiting price bound is the optimal value of a continuous-time control problem with
volatility constraint (Appendix F). (2) We adapt our model and algorithmic result to incorporate
rare jumps in the financial market, which is important because non-smooth price movement is
ubiquitous in financial markets, e.g., it can model “volatility smile” [25] (Appendix G).
2 Our model
We now describe our model, which has a similar spirit to [7, 2]. Throughout the paper we shall
focus on a discrete-time setting, i.e., the trader only has the chance to trade at discrete time points.
Specifically, consider an option that expires T days from now. We denote time 0 as the time when
a transaction of the option occurs, i.e., a trader either buys or sells the option. We assume that,
before the option expires, the trader has in total τ time points that allow trade execution. Let these
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time points be t = Tτ ,
2T
τ , ...., T . Notice that as soon as τ is decided, the value T is not a parameter
in the game (but will reappear when we consider continuous-time limit later on). Throughout our
analysis we assume no transaction costs and the market is liquid (i.e., the trader can always buy
or sell any volume of the asset at the market price at the τ time points).
We shall model the dynamic of the financial market from time 0 to T as a τ -round two-player
game between the trader and nature. Consider an option on the underlying asset S, with initial price
S0 and the price at the t-th round denoted as St(= S(tT/τ)). For each round t, where 1 ≤ t ≤ τ ,
the adversary has complete freedom to choose the return of S, given by Rt , St/St−1− 1, within a
pre-specified uncertainty set Ut (we suppress its dependence on τ for notational convenience). On
the other hand, at the beginning of each round, the trader can choose to long1 ∆t dollars’ worth of
the asset (a negative ∆t will imply a short position). At this point we do not impose any capital
capacity on the trader, i.e., ∆t can be as large or small as possible; however, we shall soon see from
our analysis that the optimal ∆t is bounded and can be explicitly found.
Let us first describe what should be the upper and lower bounds of the option price under
no-arbitrage assumption in our model. To better illustrate our ideas, all of our analysis will assume
the risk-free interest rate is 0. But all our results can be adapted to non-zero interest rates.
Upper bound. Suppose the trader shorts the option at time 0. To hedge his/her position, at
each round of the game, the trader decides to buy ∆t dollars’ worth of the underlying asset. The
cumulated payoff to the trader at time T is then given by
∑τ
t=1(Rt∆t)− g (S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +Rt)), plus
the option price that he/she gets from selling the option at time 0. Since a rational trader will
strive to maximize gain, against an adversary that strives to minimize so, the outcome of this
game to the trader will be max∆t,t∈[τ ]minRt∈Ut,t∈[τ ]
∑τ
t=1(Rt∆t)− g (S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +Rt)), again plus
the initial option price. Now, if the option price is strictly higher than −max∆t,t∈[τ ]minRt∈Ut,t∈[τ ]∑τ
t=1(Rt∆t)− g (S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +Rt)), then shorting the option and carrying out the optimal hedging
strategy gives the trader a positive gain at time 0 with no risk, i.e., an arbitrage opportunity arises.
In other words, the option price at time 0 cannot be higher than
min
∆t,t∈[τ ]
max
Rt∈Ut,t∈[τ ]
g
(
S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rt)
)
−
τ∑
t=1
(Rt∆t). (1)
Lower bound. The no-arbitrage lower bound can be obtained by reversing the action of the trader
from shorting to longing the option at time 0. Suppose the trader shorts ∆t dollars’ worth of the un-
derlying asset at the t-th round, and strives to maximize g (S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +Rt))−
∑τ
t=1(Rt∆t). It can
be argued similarly that the option price cannot be lower than max∆t,t∈[τ ]minRt∈Ut,t∈[τ ] g (S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +Rt))−∑τ
t=1(Rt∆t), or otherwise arbitrage opportunity arises.
Interpretation of bounds. Let u be the upper bound from (1) and ℓ be the corresponding lower
bound. Their interpretations are the following: (1) When an option price does not fall into [ℓ, u],
then there exists a trading strategy so that under any adversarial scenarios the overall payoff of
the strategy is strictly positive (arbitrage exists). Economically speaking, this is a “wrong” price
of the option. (2) When an option price is in [ℓ, u], then for any trading strategy, there exists an
adversary so that the payoff is non-positive (arbitrage does not exist). This price can be the “fair”
price of the option.
Oracle model for payoff functions. We assume we have oracle access to the payoff function
g(·) (which is possibly non-convex). Also, when saying g(·) is Lipschitz continuous, we mean that
for any real values x, y, we have |g(y)− g(x)| ≤ L|y − x| for some constant L.
1We adopt the terminology in finance: to “long” means to buy, and to “short” means to sell a product.
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Note that we leave the choice of the uncertainty set Ut here to depend on t. While some of
the results later (e.g., continuous-time limit) allows for time-dependent Ut, for simplicity and to
highlight the connection with Black-Scholes, much of this paper will focus on Ut that do not vary
with time, in which case we will merely denote it as U .
3 Explicit characterization of equilibrium for the hedging game
In this section we will analyze the equilibrium between the trader and the nature in every single
round, which paves the way to our main contributions in the coming sections.
A general characterization of equilibrium. We first state our characterization results for a
single-round game under very general conditions on the uncertainty set and the payoff function.
We will concentrate on the upper bound (1) in our analysis; the lower bound can be obtained easily
merely by replacing g by −g.
Suppose τ = 1, and let U be a (Borel) measurable set. Our goal is to find the optimal solution
of min∆maxR∈U g(S0(1 +R))− R∆. The following result provides an optimality characterization
for any payoff function g and any uncertainty set U :
Proposition 3.1. Let τ = 1 and S0 be the initial price. Consider a bounded uncertainty set U and
a continuous payoff function g. We have
min
∆
max
R∈U
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = max
Pf∈P(U),
ER←Pf [R]=0
EPf [g(S0(1 +R))], (2)
where P(U) denotes the set of all probability measures Pf that have support on U . The maximization
problem in the right hand side above is over all such probability measures that satisfy EPf [R] = 0.
From now on we shall call any Pf that satisfies EPf [R] = 0 a risk-neutral probability measure,
since it enforces zero expected return (such terminology has been used widely in the no-arbitrage
theory in stochastic finance [22]). Assuming U 6= {0}, the optimal value of (2) is finite only when
U contains at least a point larger than 0 and a point smaller than 0, e.g., when U is an interval
that covers 0; otherwise risk-neutral measure cannot be constructed.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 relies on a primal-dual argument applied to the following LP, which
is equivalent to the minimax problem min∆maxR∈U g(S0(1 +R))−R∆:
min p
s.t. g(S0(1 + r))− r∆ ≤ p for any r ∈ U (3)
where the decision variables are p and ∆. See Appendix B for the detailed proof. Despite its
simplicity, we have not found this proof in previous works; [7, 24] have obtained the same result as
Proposition 3.1 using other geometric arguments.
Convex payoff function For the special case where the payoff function g(·) is convex and the
uncertainty set is an interval, i.e., U = [−ζ, ζ] with ζ, ζ > 0, we are able to further characterize the
solution to the right hand side of (2) as the unique risk-neutral probability distribution with masses
concentrated at −ζ and ζ. We can generalize such result to multi-round games via recursion, which
turns out to coincide with the binomial tree model (in the case that the uncertainty sets Ut do not
vary with time; see Appendix A for details of binomial tree). We can also prove convergence to the
Black-Scholes price in the limit for a class of non-uniform Ut’s (as time step size shrinks together
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with the size of Ut’s suitably; see Appendix C.1). In Appendix C we also discuss the computational
complexity of the corresponding hedging strategies.
All the above characterizations however do not extend to non-convex options. In the next
section, we will construct and analyze a pricing algorithm for this scenario. In Appendix F, we will
show an additional result that the corresponding continuous-time limit is not the Black-Scholes
price (i.e., not driven by geometric Brownian motion), but is rather given by the solution to a
continuous-time control problem with volatility constraint.
4 Algorithms for non-convex payoffs
This section presents an approximation algorithm for computing the price upper bounds for general
payoff functions under the oracle model; the lower bound’s algorithm and its analysis is similar
and so is omitted here. Throughout this section, we will assume the size of the uncertainty set
U = [−ζ, ζ] is uniform across time steps and ζ, ζ > 0 are polynomials in τ ; at the end of this section
we will discuss the non-uniform uncertainty set case. We also assume that the payoff function
g is Lipschitz continuous and monotonically non-decreasing, and without loss of generality that
g(0) = 0.
Our algorithm. We use a fairly natural algorithm to approximate the upper bound: we discretize
the uncertainty set U , i.e., instead of allowing the adversary to choose an arbitrary value from U ,
we only allow it to choose from the discrete set Uˆ , {−ζ,−ζ + ǫ,−ζ + 2ǫ, ...., ζ}, where ǫ is a
parameter of our algorithm. We call this a multinomial tree approximation.
To compute the price upper bound for the multinomial tree, one can use a dynamic program
based on the following recursion. Specifically, let gˆt(x) be the approximate price upper bound of
the option at the t-th round. Also, let b = (ζ + ζ)/ǫ be the total number of choices an adversary
has for each move, and the choices of the return are ri = −ζ + iǫ for i ∈ [b]. We compute gˆt(x) by
finding the optimal solution of the LP:
minimize p
subject to gˆt+1(x(1 + ri))− ri∆ ≤ p for i ∈ [b] (4)
The quantity gˆ0(x) is then the approximate option price at time 0. Such discretization scheme and
backward induction is related to the so-called stochastic mesh method in the area of financial engi-
neering [12], but the latter uses Monte Carlo and importance sampling to calculate the probability
weights at each step instead of carrying out an LP.
Analysis. We shall briefly address some concerns regarding the above scheme. First, since at
each step the adversary may choose multiple ways to move the price, it could be worrying that the
number of possible states under consideration is exponential in τ . However, so long as ǫ remains
uniform over the rounds, the number of states we need to keep track of at the t-th round is t(ζ+ζ)/ǫ
(and thus linear in t). However, note that at the final round, the price Sτ could be any value in
an interval of exponential length (i.e., in the range [(1− ζ)τS0, (1 + ζ)τS0]), while our multinomial
tree algorithm only “samples” polynomial number of points from the function g(x). This implies
that on average the distance between any two sampled points is exponential, which also implies
that the overall error due to discretization can grow exponentially.
Nevertheless, here is a surprising feature of our algorithm: while a large portion of internal
states in the multinomial tree can have additive errors being ≫ δS0, the aggregate additive error
for the value function in the recursion can be shown to have order δS0, with the algorithmic running
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time being polynomial in 1δ and τ . This feature is a consequence of the probabilistic interpretation
in our dual formulation, which we will further elaborate in the proof to be presented momentarily.
To formalize the above discussion, we start with the first building block regarding the preser-
vation of Lipschitz continuity for the value functions. The lemma below can be proved by using
backward induction. See Appendix D.1 for details.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose the payoff function g(·) is Lipschitz continuous and monotonically non-
decreasing, i.e. g(x) − g(y) ≤ L(x − y) for x ≥ y. Then the value function gt(·) at the t-th round
is also Lipschitz continuous with the same Lipschitz constant for all t.
Our second building block here encapsulates the effect of local errors due to discretization. We
need to introduce an intermediate quantity gmt (x), for each t ∈ [τ ], defined as the optimal solution
of the following linear program:
minimize p
subject to gt+1(x(1 + ri))− ri∆ ≤ p for i ∈ [b] (5)
The difference between gmt (x) and gˆt(x) is that the calculation of g
m
t (x) assumes accurate access
to the function gt+1(·). Thus, we may view gmt (·) as a “hybrid variable” that sits in between gt(·)
and gˆt(·). The following gives a bound for gt(·)− gmt (·):
Lemma 4.2. With gmt (x) defined in (5), we have
0 ≤ gt(x)− gmt (x) ≤
√
2Lgt(x)xǫ+ Lxǫ (6)
where ǫ is the discretization parameter in the algorithm.
The main device we use in its proof is a convenient dual characterization of the optimal solution
obtained through the binding constraints. From this characterization, Lipschitz continuity is then
used to bound the magnitude of the local errors. See Appendix D.2 for details.
We now move to the final stage of our analysis. The following is our main result.
Theorem 4.3. The approximation g0(S0)− gˆ0(S0) satisfies
0 ≤ g0(S0)− gˆ0(S0) ≤ C1
√
ǫLτS0. (7)
for some constant C1.
The proof of this theorem relies heavily on the “artificial” risk-neutral probability measures
that define the optimal dual solutions of the several different value functions, gt(x), g
m
t (x) and
gˆt(x), for each step of backward induction. Although these probability measures have no real-
world correspondence, they confer “artificial” martingale properties on the underlying asset’s price
movement. Moreover, we are in fact granted with some freedom in choosing the measure to work
under, and we will see that the one associated with gmt (x) is the most effective in truncating the
propagation of error. We will now lay out the arguments precisely.
Proof. We first apply a standard telescoping trick (see, e.g., [12]) to “decouple” the local error
from the global error, i.e., let dt(x) = gt(x)− gˆt(x) and we have
dt(x) = (gt(x)− gmt (x)) + (gmt (x)− gˆt(x)).
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The first term represents the local error at each induction step, whereas the second term comes
from error propagation from the future. The first term gt(x) − gmt (x) is handled by Lemma 4.2.
For the second term gmt (x)− gˆt(x), we recall the dual characterization in Proposition 3.1 to write
gmt (x)− gˆt(x) = max
P∈P(Uˆ)
EP [Rt+1]=0
E [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))] − max
P∈P(Uˆ)
EP [Rt+1]=0
E [gˆt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))]
Notice that Rt+1 in both expectations above share the same support Uˆ , the discretized uncer-
tainty set. Let us write Emx,t as the expectation under P
m
x,t := argmax{E [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))] | P ∈
P(Uˆ),EP [Rt+1] = 0}. The above equation becomes
Emx,t [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))] − max
P∈P(Uˆ)
EP [Rt+1]=0
[gˆt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))]
≤ Emx,t [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))− gˆt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))]
(since Pmx,t is feasible for the maximization in the second term above)
= Emx,t[dt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))]
Hence, dt(x) can be bounded recursively under the probability measure P
m
x,t:
dt(x) ≤
√
2Lgt(x)xǫ+ Lxǫ+ E
m
x,t+1[dt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))]. (8)
Now, let us define a probability measure PmS0 on the process {St}t∈[τ ], where St = S0
∏t
i=1(1+Ri)
is the price of the underlying asset at the t-th round. This measure PmS0 is defined by the stepwise
transition probability Pmx,t on each Rt, t ∈ [τ ]. From (8), we can expand d0(S0) recursively:
d0(S0) ≤
√
2Lgt(S0)S0ǫ+ LS0ǫ+ E
m
S0,1[d1(S1)]
≤
√
2Lgt(S0)S0ǫ+ LS0ǫ+ E
m
S0,1[
√
2Lg1(S1)S1ǫ+ LS1ǫ] + E
m
S0,1E
m
S1,2[d2(S2)]
(by expanding d1(S1) by (8) again)
...
≤ EmS0
[
τ∑
t=1
{√
2Lgt(St)Stǫ+ LStǫ
}]
. (9)
Next, observe that {St}t≤τ is a martingale under PmS0 and the filtration Ft = σ(R1, . . . , Rt),
since EmS0 [Rt+1|Ft] = Emt,St [Rt+1] = 0. We leverage this fact to bound both terms in (9). First,
notice that
EmS0 [
τ∑
t=1
LǫSt] = Lǫ
τ∑
t=1
EmS0 [St] = LτǫS0
For the other term in Eq. (9), note that by Lemma 4.1 we have gt(x) ≤ Lx for any t and x. Hence
we can wrap up the analysis for (9):
EmS0
[
τ∑
t=1
{√
2ǫLgt(St)St + LǫSt
}]
≤
τ∑
t=1
EmS0 [
√
2ǫL2S2t ] + LτǫS0
=
√
2ǫL
τ1∑
t=1
EmS0 [St] + LτǫS
=
√
2ǫLτS0 + LτǫS0 ≤ C1
√
ǫLτS0,
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for some constant C1. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Thus we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.4. Let δ be an arbitrary constant. Consider using the multinomial tree approximation
algorithm to find the price upper bound. When ǫ = cδ2/(L2τ2) for some constant c, the algorithm
gives a gˆ0(S0) such that g0(S0)− δS0 ≤ gˆ0(S0) ≤ g0(S0).
Tightness of the performance. We shall show in Appendix H.2 that as long as ǫ is a polynomial
in τ , an additive error term that is linear in L and S0 will be inevitable under the oracle model.
This means that the running time of our algorithm necessarily depends on L and the additive
dependency on S is essentially tight.
Non-uniform uncertainty set. When the uncertainty sets are non-uniform, we can still use the
multinomial tree algorithm to find the approximate solution so long as the largest uncertainty set
is still polynomial in τ . We remark, though, that the parameter ǫ has to remain unchanged even if
the uncertainty sets change over the time, i.e., our ǫ is still set to ǫ = cδ2/(L2τ2).
5 American options
We generalize our results to pricing American options, including dual characterization using risk-
neutral measure and algorithmic results similar to European options.
As before, let us first consider the single-round game. The upper bound of an American option
can be expressed as:
min
∆
max
θ∈{0,1}
R∈U
((g(S0(1 +R))−R∆)(1− θ) + g(S0)θ) (10)
where θ is the decision made by the adversary in exercising the option prematurely: θ = 1
if early exercise is prompted, otherwise θ = 0. We remark that it is the adversary, not the
trader, to have the right to exercise early in upper bound evaluation. It is because the upper
bound comes from a short-option argument (see Section 2) that endows nature as the holder
of the option and hence the early exercise right. For lower bound evaluation, the bound is
max∆,θ∈{0,1}minR∈U ((g(S0(1 +R))−R∆)(1− θ) + g(S0)θ). Now let us focus on the upper bound
(10), and our first result is that part of the max and the min there can be interchanged:
Lemma 5.1. The optimization (10) can be written as
min
∆
max
θ∈{0,1}
max
R∈U
((g(S0(1 +R))−∆R)(1− θ) + g(S0)θ)
= max
θ∈{0,1}
min
∆
max
R∈U
((g(S0(1 +R))−∆R)(1− θ) + g(S0)θ)
= max

 maxP∈P(U)
E[R]=0
E[g(S0(1 +R))], g(S0)

 . (11)
Proof. To simplify notation, let us write Φ(∆, θ) , maxR∈U ((g(S0(1+R))−∆R)(1− θ)+ g(S0)θ).
Thus, we need to show min∆maxθ Φ(∆, θ) = maxθmin∆Φ(∆, θ). The direction min∆maxθ Φ(∆, θ) ≥
maxθmin∆Φ(∆, θ) is straightforward. To show that min∆maxθ Φ(∆, θ) ≤ maxθmin∆ Φ(∆, θ), the
main observation is that ∆ is only influential if θ = 0. More precisely, consider maxθmin∆Φ(∆, θ).
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When θ = 1, min∆Φ(∆, θ) = g(S0), independent of the choice of ∆; when θ = 0, we have
min∆Φ(∆, θ) = maxP∈P(U)
E[R]=0
E[g(S0(1+R))] by Proposition 3.1, and there exists ∆
∗ = argmax∆ g(S0(1+
R))−∆R. Hence
max
θ
min
∆
Φ(∆, θ) = max

 maxP∈P(U)
E[R]=0
E[g(S0(1 +R))], g(S0)

 (12)
Consider putting ∆∗ in maxθ Φ(∆, θ). We then have
min
∆
max
θ
Φ(∆, θ) ≤ max
θ
Φ(∆∗, θ) = max

 maxP∈P(U)
E[R]=0
E[g(S0(1 +R))], g(S0)

 . (13)
Thus, we have min∆maxθ Φ(∆, θ) = maxθmin∆Φ(∆, θ), which renders the single-round price upper
bound (10) as depicted in (11).
Analogous results hold for lower bound. The significance of Lemma 5.1 is that we can charac-
terize the optimal solution of the minimax problem (10) in terms of risk-neutral probability much
like the case of European options, but with an additional outer maximization in the rightmost ex-
pression in (11) to take into account the withdrawal feature. Consequently, we have the following
characterization of multi-round game:
Lemma 5.2. Consider a τ -round American option hedging game with convex payoff function g(·)
and uniform uncertainty set U = [−ζ, ζ]. The option price’s upper bound is the same as the upper
bound for its European counterpart, i.e. it is optimal to exercise at the maturity time.
The proof of this result, which is written in detail in Appendix E.1, uses an inductive argument
to show that the price upper bound for convex payoff is given by g0(S0), where gt(x) follows the
recursion
gt(x) = max
{
EPf [gt+1(x(1 +R))], g(x)
}
(14)
with Pf ∈ P({−ζ, ζ}) and EPf [R] = 0. Moreover, one can show by another induction that gt(x) ≥
g(x) (and strict inequality except t = τ when g(x) is strictly convex), and hence the conclusion.
Note that the above characterization of American option price’s upper bound turns out to
recover the τ -round binomial tree model, just like in the European option case. Using known results
for the binomial tree model [3], there is also a suitable continuous-time limit of the adversarial upper
bound of American option price to the corresponding Black-Scholes price.
For the case of concave payoff and lower bound calculation, the characterization (14) holds and
it can be shown that it is always optimal to exercise immediately, i.e. the lower bound price is
merely g(S0). For non-convex payoff in upper bound calculation, or non-concave payoff in lower
bound calculation, the above reductions do not hold. One can resort to our multinomial tree
algorithm presented in Section 4 to approximate, for instance the upper bound, using the recursive
formula gˆt(x) = max
{
maxP∈P(Uˆ)
E[R]=0
E[gˆt+1(x(1 +R))], gˆ(x)
}
where Uˆ is the discretized uncertainty
set with step length ǫ. The performance can be analyzed by using the same techniques presented
in Section 4, which gives the following corollary:
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Corollary 5.3. Let δ be an arbitrary constant. Consider using the multinomial tree approximation
algorithm to find the American option’s upper bound. When ǫ = cδ2/(L2τ2) for some constant c,
the algorithm gives an gˆ0(S0) such that g0(S0)− δS0 ≤ gˆ0(S0) ≤ g0(S0).
We remark that one arguably unsatisfying feature in our model for the upper bound of American
options is that the nature can only exercise the option at discrete rounds, i.e., at the times when
the trader can execute trade decisions. Appendix E.2 discusses how this issue can be addressed.
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A Binomial tree model
This section analyzes the standard binomial tree model and connects its analysis to our adversary
model.
Single-round case. Suppose there is only one round of the game, i.e., τ = 1. Here the trader
needs only to decide ∆, the amount of the underlying asset S to hold for hedging. In the standard
single-round binomial model (see Chapter 12 in [23]), the stock price either goes up by a factor of
(1 + u) or down by a factor of (1− d) (see Figure 1). In the literature, it is typically assumed that
the movement of S is stochastic, i.e. with certain probability S goes up and another probability
it goes down. The idea of perfect hedging [16] is to pick ∆ such that the total payoff at time 1 is
constant, regardless of the movement of S. In other words, set ∆ that satisfies
g(S0(1 + u))−∆u = g(S0(1− d))−∆(−d),
which gives ∆ = (g(S0(1 + u))− g(S0(1− d)))/(u+ d). Under this hedging strategy ∆, there is no
risk for the trader to be compensated
g(S0(1 + u))−∆u = g(S0(1− d))−∆(−d) = d
u+ d
g(S0(1 + u)) +
u
u+ d
g(S0(1− d)). (15)
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Suppose the option price is different from (15), then an arbitrage opportunity must exist. If the price
is higher, the trader shorts the option and longs ∆ dollars’ worth of the underlying asset, whereas if
the price is lower, the trader longs the option and shorts the same amount of the underlying asset.
Both cases lead to risk-free gain to the trader.
Let us now go back to our model described in Section 2, with an uncertainty set U = {u,−d}.
This is the same as the standard binomial model except that stochasticity of the underlying asset
price is now replaced by adversarial movement. The upper bound (1) becomes
min
∆
max
R∈{u,−d}
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆. (16)
It is easy to observe that (16) reaches optimum when we set ∆ such that
g(S0(1 + u))−∆u = g(S0(1− d))−∆(−d), (17)
or ∆ = (g(S0(1+u))− g(S0(1− d)))/(u+ d), leading to the same hedging strategy as the standard
(stochastic) binomial model. The same argument works for the lower bound and gives rise to the
same hedging strategy. We thus have our first basic conclusion: If the uncertainty set in our hedging
game is binomial, the upper bound of the option price matches the lower bound; moreover, this
unique price is the same as the price concluded from the standard (stochastic) binomial model.
We also make another observation on the form of our optimal value i.e., the equilibrium. Since
the optimal hedging amount ∆ for upper and lower bounds are both equal to the standard binomial
model, their corresponding optimal values are both given by (15), which can be written as
min
∆
max
R∈{u,−d}
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = max
∆
min
R∈{u,−d}
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = EΣ[g(S0(1 +R))] (18)
where Σ assigns probability d/(u + d) to upward movement u and probability u/(u + d) to down-
ward movement d. It is easily observed that Σ is “risk-neutral”, i.e., ER←Σ[R] = 0. Hence in this
particular case our upper and lower bounds of the option price are both characterized by the same
risk-neutral probability measure on the option payoff. We will see that in more general scenarios,
the option price bounds can still be characterized by risk-neutral measures, but the measures can
be different from each others, and also they can be both different from the measure used in standard
binomial pricing. Note that these risk-neutral measures act as analytical artifacts and do not have
a real-world correspondence; they will play a key role in our analysis in the rest of this paper.
Multi-round case. Keeping in mind the result above for the single-round case, our price bounds
for the multi-round setting can be obtained through straightforward backward induction (dynamic
programming). Suppose the game has τ rounds and each round entails either an up or a down
movement for the stock, i.e. Ut = {u,−d}. The upper bound (1) can be written as
min
∆t,t∈[τ ]
max
Rt∈{u,−d},t∈[τ ]
g
(
S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rt)
)
−
τ∑
t=1
(Rt∆t)
= min
∆1
max
R1∈{u,−d}
{· · · min
∆τ−1
max
Rτ−1∈{u,−d}
{· · ·min
∆τ
max
Rτ∈{u,−d}
{g (Sτ−1(1 +Rτ ))−Rτ∆τ}
−Rτ−1∆τ−1} · · · −R1∆1} (19)
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Figure 2: A two-step binomial tree model.
The quantity (19) can be solved by iteratively computing gτ (S) = g(S) and
gt−1(S) = min
∆t
max
Rt∈{u,−d}
gt(S(1 +Rt))−Rt∆t.
for t = τ, τ − 1, . . . , 1. By our result above, the solutions to each of these minimax problems are
given by EΣ[gt(S(1 +R))]. Hence our upper bound again matches the lower bound, and they both
match the price according to the standard binomial tree model.
Figure 2 illustrates an example with two rounds. A denotes the state at time 0, B and C at
time 1 and so on. We first compute the price of the option at B, by analyzing the one-stage game
assuming B is the initial time point. The same argument applies to state C. We then price the
option with initial state A by taking into account the maximal gain the trader can make in the
future when the next states are in B or C. Observe that there are in total 3 states in this example,
instead of 22 = 4, at the end of the second round. In general, the number of states at the final
level of a binomial tree grows linearly with the depth of the tree, which makes it a feasible device
for option pricing.
Binomial tree at the limit. Since our adversary binomial tree model is in effect the same as the
standard model, the continuous-time limit converges to the Black-Scholes price under appropriate
scaling. The following result is a rephrase of the well-known result in the literature [23]:
Proposition A.1. Consider the τ -round European option game. Let the uncertainty set for each
round be Uτ = {u/√τ ,−d/√τ}. Let g(·) be an arbitrary Lipschitz continuous payoff function. The
upper and lower bounds of the option with respect to Uτ are the same for any τ and they both
converge to the Black-Scholes price as τ →∞.
B Proof of Proposition 3.1
To illustrate the key idea in our analysis, let us start with analyzing a “discrete” version of the
problem, i.e., let U = {r1, r2, ..., rn} be a discrete set on R. We can write min∆maxR∈U g(S0(1 +
R))−R∆ as the following linear program (LP):
min p
s.t. g(S0(1 + ri))− ri∆ ≤ p for i ∈ [n] ≡
min p
s.t. p+ ri∆ ≥ g(S0(1 + ri)) for i ∈ [n], (20)
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where the decision variables are p and ∆. The formulations in (20) follow simply by the definition
of minimax problem, with the optimal p representing the option price’s upper bound. Now we
invoke the standard primal-dual theorem for LP on (20) and obtain the following equivalent LP in
dual form:
maximize
∑
i∈[n] wig(S0(1 + ri))
subject to
∑
i∈[n] wi = 1∑
i∈[n] wiri = 0
wi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [n]
(21)
Here wi’s are the decision variables. Observe that {wi}i∈[n] can be interpreted as a probability
distribution on the uncertainty set U since∑wi = 1. Call this distribution Pf . This is a risk-neutral
probability distribution since the expected return EPf [R] =
∑
wiri = 0. Moreover, note that the
objective function under this probability interpretation can be rewritten as
∑
i∈[n]wig(S(1+ ri)) =
ER←Pf [g(S(1 +R))]. We thus have proved (2).
We now generalize the above arguments to general uncertainty set case, with slightly more
function space technicalities. For general uncertainty set U , we can generalize (20) as:
minimize p
subject to p+ r∆ ≥ g(S0(1 + r)) for r ∈ U (22)
Next, note that the dual cone of C+(U), the set of non-negative continuous functions on U , is
P+(U), the set of positive measures on U . Since g is assumed to be continuous, the Lagrangian of
(22) is
L(p,∆, w) = p+
∫
U
(g(S0(1 + r))− r∆− p)dw(r)
where w(·) ∈ P+(U) (see [27]). The dual function is defined as
ℓ(w) = inf
p,∆
{
p+
∫
U
(g(S0(1 + r))− r∆− p)dw(r)
}
= inf
p,∆
{∫
U
g(S0(1 + r))dw(r) + (1− w(U))p +
∫
U
rdw(r)∆
}
(23)
Suppose w(·) does not satisfy either w(U) = 1 or ∫U rdw(r) = 0, then one can always find p or ∆
that gives arbitrarily large objective value in (23). Hence the dual problem maxw∈P+(U) ℓ(w) can
be written as
maximize
∫
U g(S0(1 + r))dw(r)
subject to
∫
U rdw(r) = 0
w(U) = 1
w ∈ P+(U)
(24)
Finally, it is easy to see that the constraint set in (22) has non-empty interior (by picking large
enough p for example). Hence strong duality holds and the dual optimal value in (24) equals the
primal counterpart (see e.g., Chapter 8 in [27]). By identifying w as a probability measure on U ,
we conclude that (24) is the same as (2). This completes our proof.
15
C Hedging games with convex payoff functions
This section presents results for games with convext payoffs. We shall start with a corollary of
Proposition 3.1, regarding one-round games.
Specifically, we will show that it is sufficient to consider risk-neutral probability distributions
that have point masses concentrated only on the extremes, namely −ζ and ζ, i.e.,
Corollary C.1. When the payoff function g(·) is convex and U = [−ζ, ζ], we have
min
∆
max
R∈U
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = EPf [g(S0(1 +R))] (25)
where Pf ∈ P({−ζ, ζ}) and EPf [R] = 0.
Proof. We will show that
min
∆
max
R∈U
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = max
Pf∈P({−ζ,ζ}),
ER←Pf [R]=0
EPf [g(S0(1 +R))] (26)
where P({−ζ, ζ}) is the set of probability distributions that have support only on −ζ and ζ. Since
Pf ∈ P({−ζ, ζ}) and EPf [R] = 0 uniquely defines Pf , the max operator is redundant. From there
we can conclude that (25) can be rewritten as EPf [g(S0(1 + R))], where Pf ∈ P({−ζ, ζ}) and
EPf [R] = 0.
We can prove (26) by analyzing either the primal program (22) in the proof of Proposition 3.1
or the characterization (2) directly. Let us consider the former as this is more elementary. We
argue that, in the case of convex g and U = [−ζ, ζ], the program (22) is equivalent to
minimize p
subject to p− ζ∆ ≥ g(S(1 − ζ))
p+ ζ∆ ≥ g(S(1 + ζ))
(27)
In other words, all other constraints p+ r∆ ≥ g(S(1 + r)) for r ∈ (−ζ, ζ) are redundant. To prove
this, consider any −ζ < r < ζ. One can write r = q(−ζ) + qζ where q + q = 1, q, q > 0. Suppose
the inequalities p− ζ∆ ≥ g(S(1 − ζ)) and p+ ζ∆ ≥ g(S(1 + ζ)) hold. Then
p+ r∆ = q(p− ζ∆) + q(p+ ζ∆)
≥ qg(S(1 − ζ)) + qg(S(1 + ζ))
≥ g(S(1 + r)) (by the convexity of g)
Therefore, all other constraints are redundant. Now by the same argument as the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.1 (for discrete uncertainty set), we immediately get (26). The other statement in the corollary
follows trivially.
C.1 Analysis for the multi-round model
For our multi-round game, the trader has the discretion to choose τ rounds of hedging amount
{∆t}t∈[τ ] against the nature who controls the τ rounds of returns {Rt}t∈[τ ]. We assume a uniform
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uncertainty set U = [−ζ, ζ] across time. The upper bound of the option price is then
min
∆t,t∈[τ ]
max
Rt∈U ,t∈[τ ]
g
(
S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rt)
)
−
τ∑
t=1
(Rt∆t)
= min
∆1
max
R1∈U
{· · · min
∆τ−1
max
Rτ−1∈U
{· · ·min
∆τ
max
Rτ∈U
{g (Sτ−1(1 +Rτ ))−Rτ∆τ}
−Rτ−1∆τ−1} · · · −R1∆1} (28)
The following lemma is a consequence of the result in Proposition 3.1.
Lemma C.2. Consider the τ -round hedging game with the same uncertainty set U = [−ζ, ζ] across
time and convex payoff function g(·). The upper bound of the option price is EPf [g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1+Rt))],
where Pf is the unique risk-neutral probability distribution on {−ζ, ζ} for all {Rt}t∈[τ ], i.e., Pf ∈
({−ζ, ζ}) and EPf [Rt] = 0 for all t ∈ [τ ].
Proof. The proof is a direct application of dynamic programming, coupled with the preservation
of convexity across iterations of the value functions. First, observe the following:
Fact C.1. Let h(·) be an arbitrary convex function. Then EP [h(S(1 + R))] is convex in S, where
P is an arbitrary distribution for R.
The statement is immediate by using linearity of expectations and the assumption that h(·) is
convex.
Next, we can write (28) as a dynamic program, given by gτ (x) = g(x) and
gt−1(x) = min
∆t
max
Rt∈U
gt(x(1 +Rt))−Rt∆t
for t = τ, τ − 1, . . . , 1. The price upper bound is then given by g0(S0). We prove by induction that
gt(·) are all convex and gt−1(x) = EPf [gt(x(1 + Rt))]. The statement is obvious for gτ (·). Now,
supposing gt(·) is convex, we have from Corollary C.1 that gt−1(x) = EPf [gt(x(1 +Rt))], and from
Lemma C.1 that gt−1(·) is convex. Hence the induction holds.
Explicit hedging strategy. When the uncertainty sets are uniform intervals and the payoff
function is convex, the optimal hedging strategy is straightforward (and is identical to the binomial
model): ∆t =
g(St−1(1+ζ))−g(St−1(1−ζ))
ζ+ζ
dollar on S for each round t.
Non-uniform uncertainty sets. When the uncertainty sets are non-uniform, say Ut , [−ζt, ζt],
Corollary C.1, Lemma C.1 and the form of the hedging strategy all still hold with the natural
modification. This means at each round we need only consider the two points {−ζ
t
, ζt}. However,
from a computational point of view, the number of states we need to keep track of in the backward
induction could grow exponentially in τ . Thus, a naive application of dynamic programming
algorithm will not be efficient. In Appendix H we show that exact computation of the option’s
upper bound with non-uniform uncertainty sets is #P -hard, and in Section 4 we shall design an
approximation algorithm to solve the problem.
Convergence. An immediate implication of Corollary C.1 and Lemma C.2 is that the upper
bound of the option price, when the uncertainty set is U = [−ζ, ζ] across time steps, collides with
the binomial tree model that either goes up by 1 + ζ or down by 1− ζ at each step.
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It is known that the price from the binomial tree model converges to Black-Scholes [16], as the
number of time steps increases and the interval length decreases at a rate equal to the square root
of the number of time steps. This implies the convergence of our upper bound, with uncertainty
sets Uτt = [−ζ/
√
τ , ζ/
√
τ ], also to the Black-Scholes price. Here we state a convergence result
that is more general: as long as the (possibly non-uniform) collection of uncertainty sets follow
a “bounded quadratic variation” condition, we obtain convergence to the Black-Scholes price for
European-type options:
Corollary C.3. Consider the τ -round hedging game with Lipschitz continuous convex payoff func-
tion g(·). Let {{Uτt }t≤τ}τ≥1 be the sequence of uncertainty sets and let Uτt = [−ζτt , ζ
τ
t ]. If
limτ→∞
∑τ
t=1 ζ
τ
t
ζ
τ
t = ν for a positive number ν, and supt∈[τ ]max{ζτt , ζ
τ
t } → 0, the upper bound
of the European option price converges to E[g(S0 exp{
√
νN(0, 1) − ν/2})], where N(0, 1) is stan-
dard Gaussian variable, i.e., it converges to the option price for a geometric Brownian motion with
zero drift.
We remark that if ν = σ2T for a positive constant σ2, then the condition limτ→∞
∑τ
t=1 ζ
τ
t
ζ
τ
t = ν
imitates the quadratic variation of a Brownian motion, and the result recovers the Black-Scholes
price. The uniform convergence condition supt∈[τ ]max{ζτt , ζ
τ
t } → 0 is necessary; there is no guar-
antee of Gaussian convergence in the limit if one uncertainty set keeps constant size as τ →∞.
Proof of Corollary C.3. From Lemma C.2, the upper bound of the option price, for any τ , is
EPf [g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1 + R
τ
t ))] where R
τ
t is the t-th round return in a τ -round game, and Pf (which
also depends on τ) is the unique probability measure that satisfies EPf [R
τ
t ] = 0 and has support
{−ζτ
t
, ζ
τ
t } on Rτt for any t ∈ [τ ]. Simple calculation reveals that Pf puts weights ζ
τ
t /(ζ
τ
t
+ ζ
τ
t ) on
−ζτ
t
and ζτ
t
/(ζτ
t
+ ζ
τ
t ) on ζ
τ
t . This implies that EPf [(R
τ
t )
2] = ζζ.
We shall prove that
log(S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rτt )) = logS0 +
τ∑
t=1
Rτt −
τ∑
t=1
(Rτt )
2
2
+
τ∑
t=1
ξ(Rτt )
3
(29)
where ξ(Rt) satisfies |ξ(Rτt )| ≤ C|Rτt |3 for a constant C, converges in distribution to logS0 +
N(0, 1) − ν/2.
Now consider each term in (29), and we start with
∑τ
t=1R
τ
t . Since
∑τ
t=1 EPf [(R
τ
t )
2] =
∑τ
t=1 ζ
τ
t
ζ
τ
t →
ν, and
∑τ
t=1 EPf [(R
τ
t )
2; |Rτt | > ǫ] is eventually zero as τ → ∞, for any ǫ > 0, by Lindeberg-Feller
Theorem (p. 114, (4.5) in [18]), we have
∑τ
t=1R
τ
t →
√
νN(0, 1) in distribution.
Next consider the term
∑τ
t=1
(Rτt )
2
2 . By our condition supt∈[τ ]max{ζτt , ζ
τ
t } → 0, since
∑τ
t=1 Pr(|Rτt | >
ǫ) is eventually zero as τ → ∞, for any ǫ > 0, and also ∑τt=1 EPf (Rτt )4 ≤ ∑τt=1 EPf (Rτt )2 ·
supt∈[τ ](R
τ
t )
2 → 0, the Weak Law for Triangular Arrays hold (p. 40, (5.5) in [18]), and∑τt=1(Rτt )2 →∑τ
t=1 EPf [(R
τ
t )
2] = ν in probability.
For the last term, we have |∑τt=1 ξ(Rτt )| ≤ C∑τt=1(Rτt )2 supt∈[τ ] |Rτt | → 0 in probability.
Combining all these terms, by Slutsky’s Theorem (see e.g., p. 19 in [30]), we conclude that
log(S0
∏τ
t=1(1 +R
τ
t ))→
√
νN(0, 1) − ν/2 in distribution.
Lastly, we will conclude our result by checking a uniform integrability condition (see e.g., p.
14 in [30]). First, since g is continuous, the Continuous Mapping Theorem [10] stipulates that
g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1 + R
τ
t )) converges to g(exp{
√
νN(0, 1) − ν/2}) in distribution. We shall show that
supτ EPf [g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1+R
τ
t ))
2] <∞. This will imply that g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1+R
τ
t )) is uniformly integrable,
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which will then conclude the convergence in L1 of g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1 + R
τ
t )) into g(S0 exp{
√
νN(0, 1) −
ν/2}) and conclude our result. To this end, note that
EPf
[
g(S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rτt ))
2
]
≤ C1EPf
∣∣∣∣∣S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rτt )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ C2
(for some constants C1, C2 > 0, since g is assumed to be Lipschitz continuous)
= C1S0
τ∏
t=1
EPf (1 +R
τ
t )
2 + C2 (by independence of R
τ
t )
= C1S0
τ∏
t=1
(ζτ
t
ζ
τ
t + 1) + C2
≤ C1S0 exp{
τ∑
t=1
ζτ
t
ζ
τ
t }+ C2
< C3
for some constant C3 > 0, by our assumption that
∑τ
t=1 ζ
τ
t
ζ
τ
t → ν.
C.2 Concave payoffs and lower bounds
Concave payoffs. We have a simple characterization of the hedging game’s equilibrium when
the payoff function is concave, under general conditions on Ut:
Corollary C.4. Consider a τ -round game. When the payoff function g(·) is concave, with uncer-
tainty sets {Ut}t∈[τ ] each of which contains the point 0, the option price’s upper bound is
min
∆t,t∈[τ ]
max
Rt∈Ut,t∈[τ ]
g
(
S0
τ∏
t=1
(1 +Rt)
)
−
τ∑
t=1
(Rt∆t) = g(S0) (30)
Proof. Consider a single-round game i.e., τ = 1. Recall Proposition 3.1, which states that the
upper bound is maxPf∈P(U):EPf [R]=0
EPf [g(S0(1+R))]. By Jensen’s inequality, EPf [g(S0(1+R))] ≤
g(S0(1 + EPf [R])) = g(S0) for any Pf ∈ P(U) such that EPf [R] = 0. The result is then immediate
for τ = 1.
The conclusion from multi-round game follows exactly the same as the argument for Lemma
C.2 (now concavity is preserved in every step in the backward induction).
Lower bounds. By replacing g with −g in all analysis above, we immediately get results for
lower bounds. The following is analogous to Proposition 3.1:
Proposition C.5. Let τ = 1 and S0 be the initial price. Consider a bounded uncertainty set U
and a continuous payoff function g. The lower bound of the option price is
max
∆
min
R∈U
g(S0(1 +R))−R∆ = min
Pf∈P(U),
ER←Pf [R]=0
EPf [g(S0(1 +R))], (31)
where P(U) denotes the set of all probability measures Pf that have support on U . The maximization
problem in the right hand side above is over all such probability measures that satisfy EPf [R] = 0.
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The following summarizes the characterizations for convex and concave payoffs:
Corollary C.6. Consider the τ -round European option hedging game, with uncertainty sets {Ut}t∈[τ ].
The following results hold:
1. Suppose the payoff function g is concave. If the uncertainty sets Ut = [−ζt, ζt] for all t ∈ [τ ],
then the lower bound is EPf [g(S0
∏τ
t=1(1+Rt))], where Pf is the unique risk-neutral measure
supported on {−ζ
t
, ζt} for each Rt, i.e. EPf [Rt] = 0.
2. Suppose the payoff function g is convex, and the uncertainty sets Ut all contain the point 0.
Then the lower bound is g(S0).
D Missing analysis for non-convex payoffs
D.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
We prove by (backward) induction. Obviously gτ (x) = g(x) satisfies the Lipschitz condition.
Suppose gt+1(x) satisfies gt+1(x)− gt+1(y) ≤ L(x− y) for x ≥ y. We prove gt(x)− gt(y) ≤ L(x− y)
for x ≥ y by contradiction.
Assuming this is not true, then
max
P∈P(U):E[R]=0
E[gt+1((x+ δ)(1 +R))] > max
P∈P(U):E[R]=0
E[gt+1(x(1 +R))] + Lδ
for some x ∈ U and δ > 0. Now let P˜f be an optimal solution for E[gt+1((x + δ)(1 + R))] (the
existence of an optimal solution will be seen immediately in the next lemma). Then
EP˜f [gt+1((x+ δ)(1 +R))] = maxPf∈P(U):E[R]=0
E[gt+1((x+ δ)(1 +R))]
> max
Pf∈P(U):E[R]=0
E[gt+1(x(1 +R))] + Lδ
≥ EP˜f [gt+1(x(1 +R))] + Lδ.
But since gt+1(x) is assumed to be Lipschitz continuous, we have
EP˜f [gt+1((x+ δ)(1 +R))]− EP˜f [gt+1(x(1 +R))] ≤ EP˜f [Lδ(1 +R)] = Lδ
by the risk-neutral property of P˜f . This leads to a contradiction.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
We shall first show that the primal formulation
minimize p
subject to p+ r∆ ≥ gt+1(x(1 + r)) for all r ∈ U (32)
has the following property in terms of binding constraints:
Lemma D.1. For any t and x, there exists an optimal solution for (32), say (p∗,∆∗), such that
either:
1. p∗ = gt+1(x) or
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2. There are exactly two binding constraints, corresponding to r(1) and r(2), such that r(1) > 0
and r(2) < 0. These two constraints uniquely define (p∗,∆∗).
Proof of Lemma D.1. First, there must be at least one binding constraint for (32), because if not,
one can always decrease p to achieve lower objective value while preserving all constraints. On the
other hand, there must be at most two binding constraints for (32); otherwise, there will be three
linearly independent equations p∗ + ri∆
∗ = gt+1(x(1 + ri)) for some ri, i = 1, 2, 3 that (p
∗,∆∗)
satisfies, which is impossible.
Next, let us move to the case where there are two binding constraints. We need to show that
r(1) < 0 < r(2). Suppose r(1), r(2) > 0. We can see that the dual program of (32) is infeasible, which
means the primal LP is either infeasible or unbounded. Infeasibility is easily ruled out since one
can put ∆ = 0 and a large enough p to construct a feasible solution. To show that unboundedness
is also impossible, we will show that all p that are smaller than a negative threshold are infeasible,
implying the minimization problem (32) is finite. To this end, consider any r˜1 > 0 and −r˜2 < 0
that lie in U . Suppose p+ r˜1∆ ≥ gt+1(x(1 + r˜1)). This implies ∆ ≥ (gt+1(x(1 + r˜1))− p)/r˜1. Now,
if we choose p to be very negative, then
p− r˜2∆ ≤ p− r˜2 gt+1(x(1 + r˜1))− p
r˜1
=
(
1 +
r˜1
r˜2
)
p− r˜2
r˜1
gt+1(x(1 + r˜1)) < gt+1(x(1− r˜2))
and hence (p,∆) does not satisfy p − r˜2∆ ≥ gt+1(x(1 − r˜2)). Hence the set of feasible p must be
bounded from below. Similarly, we can show that it is impossible to have r(1), r(2) < 0. It is trivial
to see that the two binding constraints uniquely define (p∗,∆∗).
Finally, suppose there is exactly one binding constraint. When r in the corresponding binding
constraint is non-zero, the dual LP is again infeasible, which will result in a contradiction again as
above.
We may now proceed to prove Lemma 4.2. Recall that we use the following LP to compute
gt(x):
minimize p
subject to gt+1(x(1 + r))− r∆ ≤ p for r ∈ U (33)
Let (p∗,∆∗) be the optimal solution. By Lemma D.1, we have either 1) p∗ = gt+1(x) or 2) there
exists a pair r(1) and r(2) such that r(1) < 0 < r(2) and
p∗ + r(i)∆∗ = gt+1(x(1 + r
(i)) for i = 1, 2.
Let us focus on the second case, as the first case follows similarly. In this case, we can express
p∗ = gt(x) in terms of r
(1) and r(2) as follows:
gt(x) =
r(2)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(1)))− r
(1)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(2))) (34)
Since the discretization length is ǫ, there exist rˆ(1) < 0 < rˆ(2) ∈ Uˆ such that 0 ≤ r(1) − rˆ(1) < ǫ
and 0 ≤ rˆ(2) − r(2) < ǫ, i.e., we can define rˆ(1) as the closest ri that is at least as large as r(1) and
rˆ(2) as the closest ri that is at least as small as r
(2). Note that a lower bound of gmt (x) is given by
the optimal solution of the following linear program:
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minimize p
subject to gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(1)))− xrˆ(1)∆ ≤ p
gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(2)))− xrˆ(2)∆ ≤ p
(35)
This LP can be solved analytically, which gives us
gmt (x) ≥
rˆ(2)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(1)))− rˆ
(1)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(2))). (36)
Now let η > ǫ be a parameter to be decided later. We consider two cases.
Case 1. r(2) − r(1) ≥ η. First we can see that
rˆ(2)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) ≥
r(2)
r(2) − r(1)
(
1− ǫ
η
)
(37)
since
rˆ(2)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) =
r(2)
r(2) − r(1) +
rˆ(1)r(2) − rˆ(2)r(1)
(rˆ(2) − rˆ(1))(r(2) − r(1))
=
r(2)
r(2) − r(1) +
r(2)(rˆ(1) − r(1))− r(1)(rˆ(2) − r(2))
(rˆ(2) − rˆ(1))(r(2) − r(1))
≥ r
(2)
r(2) − r(1) −
r(2)ǫ
(rˆ(2) − rˆ(1))(r(2) − r(1)) (since −rˆ
(1)(rˆ(2) − r(2)) ≥ 0 and |rˆ(1) − r(1)| < ǫ)
≥ r
(2)
r(2) − r(1) −
r(2)ǫ
(r(2) − r(1))2 (by construction we have rˆ
(2) − rˆ(1) ≥ r(2) − r(1))
≥ r
(2)
r(2) − r(1)
(
1− ǫ
η
)
.
Similarly, we have
− rˆ
(1)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) ≥ −
r(1)
r(2) − r(1)
(
1− ǫ
η
)
. (38)
Hence we may continue (36) and get:
gmt (x) ≥
rˆ(2)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(1)))− rˆ
(1)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(2)))
≥ r
(2)
r(2) − r(1)
(
1− ǫ
η
)(
gt+1(x(1 + r
(1)))− xL(r(1) − rˆ(1))
)
− r
(1)
r(2) − r(1)
(
1− ǫ
η
)
gt+1(x(1 + r
(2)))
(by Lipschitz continuity of gt+1, and Eq. (37) and (38))
=
(
1− ǫ
η
){
r(2)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(1)))− r
(1)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(2)))
}
− xLǫ
(
1− ǫ
η
)
= gt(x)(1 − ǫ
η
)− xLǫ (by Eq. (34)).
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Case 2. When r(2) − r(1) < η. This implies r(2) < η and r(1) > −η. We shall first show that
|gt+1(x)− gt(x)| is small. Specifically,
|gt+1(x) − gt(x)|
=
∣∣∣∣gt+1(x) −
(
r(2)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(1)))− r
(1)
r(2) − r(1) gt+1(x(1 + r
(2)))
)∣∣∣∣
≤ r
(2)
r(2) − r(1)
∣∣∣gt+1(x) − gt+1(x(1 + r(1)))∣∣∣− r(1)
r(2) − r(1)
∣∣∣gt+1(x)− gt+1(x(1 + r(2)))∣∣∣
≤ 2Lx |r
(1) · r(2)|
r(2) − r(1) (by Lipschitz continuity of gt+1(·))
≤ 2Lx|r(1)| (since r(2)
r(2)−r(1)
≤ 1)
≤ 2Lxη
We next use the above inequality to compute a lower bound for gmt (x):
gmt (x)
≥ rˆ
(2)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(1)))− rˆ
(1)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x(1 + rˆ
(2))) (by Eq.(36))
≥ rˆ
(2) − rˆ(1)
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) gt+1(x) −
2Lx|rˆ(1)rˆ(2)|
rˆ(2) − rˆ(1) (Lipschitz condition)
≥ gt+1(x)− 2Lx|rˆ(1)| (again use the fact that rˆ(2)rˆ(2)−rˆ(1) ≤ 1)
≥ gt(x)− (2η + 2ǫ)Lx. (since |rˆ(1)| ≤ |rˆ(1) − r(1)|+ |r(1)| ≤ ǫ + η)
Summarizing both cases, we have
gt(x)− gmt (x) ≤ minη>ǫ max
{
gt(x)
ǫ
η
+ xLǫ, (2η + 2ǫ)Lx
}
≤ min
η>ǫ
max
{
gt(x)
ǫ
η
, 2Lxη
}
+ 2ǫLx
≤
√
gt(x)2ǫLx+ 2Lǫx
by setting η =
√
gt(x)ǫ/(2Lx) when ǫ ≤
√
gt(x)/(2Lx), and η = ǫ when ǫ >
√
gt(x)/(2Lx).
E Missing proofs for American options
E.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
The proof follows similarly as that for European-type options. We will start by arguing that gt(x)
is convex for any t and
gt(x) = max

 maxP∈P({−ζ,ζ})
E[R]=0
E[gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))], g(x)

 . (39)
by induction. First, as in Corollary C.1, when gt+1(·) is convex, the optimal risk-neutral measure
for the dual problem at the t-th round, assuming the option is not exercised, has probability masses
only at {−ζ, ζ}. Second, when gt+1(·) is convex, maxP∈P({−ζ,ζ})
E[R]=0
E[gt+1(S(1 + R))] is also convex
by Lemma C.1. Since the maximum of convex functions is still convex, we conclude the induction.
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Note that (39) can be written as
gt(x) = max
{
EPf [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1))], g(x)
}
.
where Pf ∈ P({−ζ, ζ}) is a risk-neutral measure satisfying E[R] = 0. We argue that gt(x) ≥ g(x)
and EPf [gt(x(1 + Rt))] ≥ g(x) for any t and x, by induction again. Indeed, if gt+1(x) ≥ g(x) for
any x, then EPf [gt+1(x(1 + Rt+1))] ≥ gt+1(EPf [x(1 + Rt+1)]) by Jensen inequality, which is equal
to gt+1(x) since EPf [Rt+1] = 0, and hence dominates g(x) by the induction hypothesis. We have
therefore shown the claim, which implies that it is optimal to exercise at the maturity.
E.2 Continuous-time exercise right
One arguably unsatisfying feature in our model for the upper bound of American options is that
the nature can only exercise the option at discrete rounds, i.e., at the times when the trader can
execute trade decisions. There is a natural formulation to relax this constraint, and it turns out
that this relaxation does not change our existing model.
Definition E.1 (American option hedging game with continuous-time exercise right.). We model
the dynamics for an American option, with payoff g(·) and expiration T , by considering a τ -round
game between the trader and the nature. The time length for each round is γ , T/τ . Let {−ζ
i
, ζ i}
be the uncertainty parameters for the i-th round. In this game,
• the investor is only allowed to trade at the beginning of each round, i.e., at time 0, γ, 2γ, ..., T .
• the adversary is allowed to exercise the option at any time. The adversary also decides the
(continuous) trajectory of the price movement subject to the following constraints specified by
the uncertainty parameters: let t = iγ+ δ, where δ < γ; we require −ζ
i+1
·δ/γ ≤ St/Siγ−1 ≤
ζ i+1 · δ/γ for any δ < γ.
Intuitively, the price movement lies in the uncertainty set in the form of a “cone” that ex-
tends from time iγ to (i + 1)γ. By using a simple change of variable trick, we have the following
observation:
Corollary E.2. In the model in Definition E.1, the upper bound of an American option’s price is
the same as the upper bound from the ordinary hedging game introduced in Section 5.
F Convergence to continuous-time control problems for non-convex
options
In this section, we show that our minimax upper bound of the option price, with possibly non-
convex payoff, converges to the price based on a controlled diffusion process when the uncertainty
sets are appropriately scaled. To facilitate discussion, for this section we let the time steps be
0, δ, 2δ, . . . , T (for simplicity let T be a multiple of δ), and thus τ = Tδ . Let Uδ = [−ζδ, ζ
δ
], where
−ζδ , −ζ
√
δ and ζ
δ
, ζ
√
δ. Let us recall that we write S(t) as the continuous-time price of
the underlying asset at time t, with S(0) = S0 (this process is decided by nature). We have the
following theorem:
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Theorem F.1. Let g be a Lipschitz continuous payoff function. As δ → 0, the upper bound of the
option price defined by
min
∆1,∆2,...,∆τ
max
Rδ
1
,...,Rδτ∈U
δ
g
(
S0
τ∏
i=1
(1 +Rδi )
)
−
τ∑
i=1
∆iR
δ
i (40)
converges to
G(0, S0) := max
ξ
E[g(S(T ))]. (41)
Here S(t) follows the dynamic
dS(t) = σ(u)S(t)dw(t) (42)
where w(t) is a standard Brownian motion, σ(u) = u is the controlled volatility, and ξ = {u(t), 0 ≤
t ≤ T : u(t) ∈ U} is an adapted control sequence. The domain of control U = [0, ζζ].
Intuitively, this theorem asserts that the continuous-time limit of the option price’s upper bound
for non-convex payoff is Gaussian in nature, similar to the case of convex payoff and Black-Scholes
model. The crucial difference with those cases, however, is that nature now has the additional power
to choose (to reduce) the volatility at any point of time, and this is only helpful to nature in the
case of non-convex payoff. Since we know from Section 4 that in the discrete-time setting with non-
convex payoff, the nature does not necessarily choose the extremal point in the uncertainty set, it is
not surprising that there is reduction in volatility at certain points of time in the continuous-time
counterpart. In Appendix F.1 we will also demonstrate how Theorem F.1 can be easily reduced to
Black-Scholes model in the case of convex payoff.
The way to show Theorem F.1 is to view the diffusion process (42) as the starting object, and
argue that the discrete-time game is an approximating Markov chain of (42) [26]. The following is
the key to prove Theorem F.1:
Theorem F.2. Consider x(t) = x0+
∫ t
0 σ(w(s), u(s))dw(s) where w(t) is a standard Brownian mo-
tion, and u(t) is an adapted control sequence on a compact set U . Let V (t, x) = maxE(t,x)[h(x(T ))],
where h is continuous and E(t,x) denotes the expectation conditional on x(t) = x.
Consider a Markov chain approximation as follows. Divide the time into steps of size δ. Define
a Markov chain {Xδ(t)}t=0,δ,2δ,...,T with transition pδ(x, y|α). Let V δ(T, x) = h(x). For each step
backward, solve
V δ(t, x) = max
α∈U
Eδ,α
(t,Xδ(t)=x)
[V δ(t+ δ,Xδ(t+ δ))]
where Eδ,α
(t,Xδ(t)=x)
is the expectation taken using the transition pδ(x, y|α) for Xδ(t + δ). Then we
interpolate Xδ(·) and V δ(·, x) such that they are piecewise constant on t ∈ [0, T ], i.e., Xδ(s) =
Xδ(iδ) and V δ(s, x) = V δ(iδ, x) for iδ ≤ s < (i+ 1)δ.
Suppose that
1. σ(x, α) is Lipschitz continuous in x, uniformly in U .
2. The transition is locally consistent, i.e., Eδ,α
(t,Xδ(t)=x)
[Xδ(t+δ)−Xδ(t)] = o(δ), Eδ,α
(t,Xδ(t)=x)
(Xδ(t+
δ) − Xδ(t))2 = σ(x, α)2δ + o(δ) for any α ∈ U , and sup0≤t≤T |Xδ(t + δ) − Xδ(t)| a.s.→ 0 as
δ → 0.
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3. h is uniformly integrable, i.e., limη→∞ supδ E
δ,α
(t,x)[|h(Xδ(T ))|; |h(Xδ(T ))| > η] < ∞ for any
t, x.
Then V δ(t, x)→ V (t, x) pointwise on t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R+.
Outline of proof. The proof is adapted from that of [26], p. 356, Theorem 1.4. As such we only
provide an outline here. The proof calls on machinery in weak convergence analysis. Since there
is no regularity condition on the control u(t) in (42), the first step is to enlarge the space of the
process to measure-valued space. Namely, for any given control sequence {u(t)}t∈[0,T ], we can write
x(t) = S0 +
∫ t
0
∫
U
σ(α)x(v)M(dαdv) (43)
whereM(dαdv) is a real measure-valued continuous random process defined with, roughly speaking,
the following properties: For any fixed measurable subset A in U , M(A, t) is a martingale that has
quadratic variation m(A, t) (so-called martingale measure; see [26], p. 352, (1.9)). The quantity
m(·, ·) is the so-called relaxed control, and is a measure that puts a delta mass if the control u(t) ∈ A
at time t ([26], p. 263, (5.1)). Under Lipschiz continuity of σ(·, ·) and compact control set U , there
is a unique weak sense solution to (43) ([26], p. 353, discussion under A1.1).
Now, one can similarly define xδ(t) = S0 +
∫ t
0
∫
U σ(α)x
δ(v)M δ(dαdv) under the relaxed control
mδ that is discretized and interpolated through the time steps 0, δ, 2δ, . . . , T , and M δ(A, t) has
quadratic variation mδ(A, t). By p. 356, Theorem 1.3 in [26], under the conditions of Lipshitz
continuity of σ(·, ·) and local consistency (i.e., conditions 1) and 2) in our theorem), there exists a
subsequence (M δ,mδ) that converges weakly to (M,m). By uniform integrability (i.e., condition
3)), we then have lim infδ V
δ(t, x) ≥ V (t, x) for any t, x [3]. The final step is to argue that the
inequality is in fact matched by some control. This consists of choosing a so-called ǫ-optimal
solution of the relaxed control by using a finite-dimensional Wiener process and a finite-valued
and piecewise constant control, and arguing that this solution provides an ǫ-approximation to the
optimal value ([26], p. 355, Theorem 13.1.2).
Proof of Theorem F.1. We will show that our hedging game is an approximating Markov chain
to the control problem given in (41), and has the three listed properties in Theorem F.2. First,
the σ(x, α) in Theorem F.2 equals xα in (42), where α is the control lying in the compact set
U = [0, ζζ].
Second, we check the local consistency property. Define {Gδ(t, x)}t=0,δ,2δ,...,T as the value func-
tion in each step of the backward induction in the discrete-time hedging game defined in (40). Note
that by Proposition 3.1, Gδ(iδ, Sδ(iδ)) = max
P∈P([−ζδ,ζ
δ
])
E[Gδ((i+1)δ, Sδ(iδ)(1 +Rδi ))], where we
define Sδ(iδ) = S0
∏i
j=1(1 +R
δ
j) for i ∈ [τ ], and piecewise constant interpolation of Sδ(t) for other
t. In fact, we can rewrite this as
maxp1,p2,r1,r2 p1G(t+ δ, S
δ(t)(1 + r1)) + p2G(t+ δ, S
δ(t)(1 + r2))
subject to p1r1 + p2r2 = 0
p1 + p2 = 0
p1, p2 ≥ 0,−ζδ ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ζδ
(44)
where we encode the maximal probability distribution in (44) by {p1, p2, r1, r2}. Let α2δ = p1r21 +
p2r
2
2. Then the range of α is [0, ζ
δζ
δ
/δ] = [0, ζζ]. We then have Eδ,α
(t,Sδ(t)=x)
[Sδ(t + δ) − Sδ(t)] = 0
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and Eδ,α
(t,Sδ(t)=x)
(Sδ(t + δ) − Sδ(t))2 = Eδ,α
(t,Sδ(t)=x)
[(Sδ(t))2(Rδ)2] = (Sδ(t))2α2δ (here Rδ denotes
i.i.d copy of Rδi in (40)). Moreover, |Sδ(t + δ) − Sδ(t)| ≤ max{ζδ, ζ
δ} = max{ζ, ζ} · δ and so
sup0≤t≤T |Sδ(t+δ)−Sδ(t)| a.s.→ 0. (One can see the policy defined in terms of α above is not unique;
nevertheless it does not affect local consistency.)
Finally, we claim that g is uniformly integrable. We use an argument similar to the proof
of Corollary C.3, and conclude that supδ E
δ,α
(t,x)[g(S
δ(T ))2] ≤ C1S0 exp{Tζζ} + C2 < ∞ for some
constants C1, C2 > 0, by Lipschitz continuity of g and that α ∈ [0, ζζ]. This will imply that g is
uniformly integrable.
F.1 Reduction to Black-Scholes model from controlled diffusion process
This section elaborates on the above analysis and provides an alternative proof for the continuous-
time convergence of our price upper bound to the Black-Scholes model when the payoff function
is convex. We shall derive a heuristic partial differential equation (PDE) that characterizes the
solution for the controlled diffusion in Theorem F.1. Then, under additional convexity assumption,
we will demonstrate that our PDE is rigorously defined and coincides with the PDE for the Black-
Scholes model.
To begin, let us write down a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation informally using (41)
and (42). Define G(t, x) = maxξ E(t,x)[g(S(T ))], where E(t,x) denotes the expectation conditional
on S(t) = x and using the optimal control (and hence G(0, S(0)) is as defined in (41)). Assuming
for the moment that G ∈ C2, we can heuristically write
G(t, x) = max
ξ
E(t,x)[G(t+ δ, S(t + δ))]
= max
ξ
E(t,x)[G(t, x) +Gt(t, x)δ +Gx(t, x)xR
δ +
1
2
Gxxx
2(Rδ)2 + · · · ] (by Taylor’s series)
= G(t, x) +Gt(t, x)δ +
1
2
Gxxx
2max
ξ
E(t,x)[(R
δ)2] + · · · (since E(t,x)[Rδ] = 0)
where Rδ = S(t+ δ)/S(t) − 1, Gx(t, x) = ∂∂xG(t, x), Gxx(t, x) = ∂
2
∂x2
G(t, x) etc.
Since U = [0, ζζ] and E(t,x)[(R
δ)2] = σ(u)2δ, one can attempt to establish that G(t, x) is the
solution of the following PDE:
Gt(t, x) +
1
2
max
u∈U
σ(u)2x2Gxx(t, x) = 0 (45)
with the boundary condition G(T, x) = g(x). In general, the solution of this PDE may not exist in
the classical sense, and there is no guarantee to coincide with the optimal solution to the control
problem in (41) [20]. The following theorem, nevertheless, presents a verification of the PDE’s
solution as the control problem’s optimum, under a priori smoothness condition on G:
Theorem F.3. Suppose G∗ ∈ C2 is a solution for (45) (hence implying that the payoff function g
must be in C2), and that there exists an optimal u∗(t, x) as the optimal solution to the max in (45).
Then G∗(0, x) is the optimal solution to the control problem in (41), and u∗(t, x) is the optimal
control in (42).
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Proof. The proof follows by a standard application of Ito’s lemma. For any t < t′ and x, we have
E∗(t,x)[G
∗(t′, S(t′))]−G∗(t, x)
= E∗(t,x)
[∫ t′
t
G∗t (t, S(t))dt+
∫ t′
t
G∗x(t, S(t))dSt +
∫ t′
t
1
2
G∗xx(t, S(t))σ
2(u∗(t, S(t)))dt
]
= E∗(t,x)
[∫ t′
t
(
G∗t (t, S(t)) +
1
2
G∗xx(t, S(t))σ
2(u∗(t, S(t)))
)
dt
]
(since S(t) is a martingale)
= 0
by (45), where E∗(t,x) denotes the expectation taken when the control is u
∗. On the other hand,
any control u(t, x) must satisfy
Gt(t, x) +
1
2
σ(u(t, x))2x2Gxx(t, x) ≤ 0 (46)
by the definition of (45). Hence the same argument leads to
Eu(t,x)[G(t
′, S(t′))] −G(t, x)
= Eu(t,x)
[∫ t′
t
Gt(t, S(t))dt +
∫ t′
t
Gx(t, S(t))dS(t) +
∫ t′
t
1
2
Gxx(t, S(t))σ
2(u(t, S(t)))dt
]
≤ 0
where E∗(t,x) denotes the expectation taken when the control is u. Hence E
∗
(t,x)[G
∗
t (t
′, S(t′))] =
G∗t (t, x) ≥ Eu(t,x)[G(t′, S(t′))] for any u. Take t = 0 and x = S0, we obtain the result.
From Theorem F.3, we can obtain the Black-Scholes price when the payoff is convex. Observe
that (45) can in fact be written as
Gt(t, x) +
1
2
ζζx2Gxx(t, x)I(Gxx(t, x) ≥ 0) = 0 (47)
with boundary condition G(T, x) = g(x). Suppose G ∈ C2 is convex in x and so Gxx(t, ·) ≥ 0, then
the equation (47) reduces to
Gt(t, x) +
1
2
ζζx2Gxx(t, x) = 0
which is the ordinary Black-Scholes PDE with zero risk-free rate, whose solution is known to be
convex and lies in C2 when the payoff g is convex and in C2 [31]. Hence by Theorem F.3 it is the
solution to the control problem in (41), which is the limit of our hedging game model.
Lastly, suppose that Gxx(t, ·) is concave, and so Gxx(t, x) < 0. The equation (47) then reduces
to Gt(t, x) = 0, which implies that the solution is g(x), constant over t ∈ [0, T ]. If the payoff g is
concave, we know again by Theorem F.3 that g(x) is the optimal value of (41).
G Integration of non-stochastic framework with price jumps
A natural extension to the Black-Scholes framework is to allow “shocks” in the movement of the
stock price, typically modeled by the stochastic community as Poisson arrivals of jumps on top
of a continuous geometric Brownian motion on the asset price. In this section we will adopt our
adversary framework to incorporate price jumps.
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There can be various ways to model when and how much the adversary can control the price
to jump. Below we analyze two natural examples that can be extended from our framework in the
previous sections. In the first example, we assume the adversary has no control over the occurrence
and magnitude of jumps. We will show that the price upper bound is exactly the same as the price
in the standard jump diffusion model, when the payoff function is convex. In the second example,
the adversary can control when the jump happens, subject to a constraint on the total number of
jumps. The magnitude of the jumps can also be assumed to be controllable by the adversary, and
we will see that only small modifications to the algorithm presented in Section 4 are needed.
Example 1. The random jump model. This model assumes a convex payoff function and
that the nature performs a jump with a prefixed small probability q at each step. If a jump occurs,
the nature moves according to a return Y that is random (whose distribution is given). Otherwise,
with 1 − q probability, the nature will have freedom to choose its path inside the uncertainty set
U . We also assume q is sufficiently small (this will be specified precisely in the sequel).
Consider first a single-round game, with initial price of the underlying asset S0. The upper
bound formulation is
min
∆
max
R
(1− q)[(g(S0(1 +R)))−∆R] + qEY [g(S0(1 + Y ))−∆Y ], (48)
where R is the return that nature can choose, if a jump does not occur. The expectation EY is
with respect to the jump magnitude variable Y .
The formulation (48) can be written as
minimize p
subject to (1− q)[(g(x(1 + r)))−∆r] + qEY [g(x(1 + Y ))−∆Y ] ≤ p for all r ∈ U (49)
or
minimize p
subject to p+∆((1− q)r + qEY [Y ]) ≥ (1− q)g(x(1 + r)) + qEY [g(x(1 + Y ))] for all r ∈ U
(50)
The dual of (50) is
max (1− q)E[g(x(1 + r))] + qEY [g(x(1 + Y ))]
subject to (1− q)E[r] + qEY [Y ] = 0
P ∈ P(U)
(51)
where P(U) denotes the set of all probability measures supported on U .
We can use the same convexity argument as in Section C to argue that the optimal measure
must be concentrated at the two extreme points of U , namely −ζ and ζ, when q is small enough
i.e., (1 − q)(−ζ) + qEY [Y ] > 0 and (1 − q)ζ + qEY [Y ] < 0. Let the weights of these two extreme
points be w1 and w2. The constraints (1 − q)(w1(−ζ) + w2ζ) + qEY [Y ] = 0 and w1 + w2 = 1
completely determine
w1 =
ζ + qEY [Y ]1−q
ζ + ζ
, w2 =
ζ + −qEY [Y ]1−q
ζ + ζ
(52)
Therefore, the upper bound is
(1− q)

ζ + qEY [Y ]1−q
ζ + ζ
g(x(1 + ζ)) +
ζ−qEY [Y ]
1−q
ζ − ζ g(x(1 + ζ))

 + qEY [g(x(1 + Y ))]. (53)
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For a τ -round game, the formulation follows analogously as in Section C.1, with the optimal value
being the value function of a dynamic program, with gτ (x) = g(x) and gt(x) equal to (53) but with
g replaced by gt+1. This characterization is exactly the same as a discrete jump diffusion process,
studied in [4], which also demonstrated the continuous-time limit under appropriate scaling of the
jump probability and the binomial return rates. This leads immediately to the following:
Proposition G.1. Consider the random jump model with jump probability qτ = q/τ for a constant
q, jump magnitude random variable Y (not scaled with τ), and uncertainty set U τ = [−ζ/√τ , ζ/√τ ]
at each step t ∈ [τ ]. Assume a convex payoff g(·). The upper bound of the option price converges
to E[g(S(T ))], where S(t) follows a jump diffusion process given by
S(t) = S0 exp{νw(t)− ν/2 +
J(t)∑
j=1
log Y (j)}.
Here ν = ζζ, J(t) is a Poisson process with rate p, and Y (j) are i.i.d. copies of Y .
Example 2. The adversarial jump model. In this model, we allow the adversary to make
no more than ℓ jumps throughout the τ rounds of game. When the adversary decides to make a
jump, it can choose a return from the uncertainty set W; Otherwise, it can only choose from the
ordinary uncertainty set U . We assume the sizes of U and W are both polynomial in τ . Typically
W ⊃ U , but it is not required in the analysis.2
We now explain how our analysis in Section 3 and our algorithm in Section 4 can be extended
to this scenario. Define gt(x, ℓ) as the price upper bound at the t-th round when the underlying
asset’s price is x and the nature still has ℓ number of jump quota. At the t-th round, if ℓ ≥ 1,
the adversary may choose to use a jump, in which case the relevant price upper bound at the next
round will be gt+1(x(1+R), ℓ−1), where R ∈ W; suppose the adversary chooses not to jump, then
the relevant price upper bound becomes gt+1(x(1 + R), ℓ), where R ∈ U . The LP formulation for
each round is thus
minimize p
subject to gt+1(x(1 + r), ℓ)− r∆ ≤ p for r ∈ U
gt+1(x(1 + r), ℓ− 1)− r∆ ≤ p for r ∈ W, if ℓ ≥ 1.
(54)
By an argument similar to Proposition 3.1, we can introduce a risk-neutral measure that char-
acterizes the optimal dual solution for (54). The additional feature here is that the risk-neutral
measure comprises of a mixture between the ordinary uncertainty set and the enlarged uncertainty
set, depending on whether a jump is initiated. The dual formulation can be written as
max
q∈[0,1],Pf∈P(U),PJ∈P(W):
qEf [Rt+1]+(1−q)EJ [Rt+1]=0
qEPf [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1), ℓ)] + (1− q)EPJ [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1), ℓ− 1)]
Here q is the mixture probability of the occurrence of jump, and Pf and PJ are the conditional
distributions supported on U and W respectively, depending on whether a jump occurs. When
ℓ = 0, then the dual formulation reduces to the case in Section 4, and we merely have
max
Pf∈P(U)Ef [Rt+1]
EPf [gt+1(x(1 +Rt+1), 0)]
2For simplicity, we assume the uncertainty sets when jumps are present and absent are both uniform. This
condition can easily be relaxed.
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The dynamic program has the terminal value gτ (x, ℓ) = g(x) for all ℓ and gt(x, 0) = gt(x) for all t,
where gt(x) is defined in Section 4.
From this characterization, we can use a multinomial approximation scheme similar to that
in Section 4 to compute the price upper bound for general payoff functions. In this algorithm we
discretize the uncertainty sets U andW into Uˆ and Wˆ so that the step length in each discrete set is ǫ.
The new feature is that in each backward induction step, we compute gˆt(x,m) for m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ},
where x can take on polynomial number of distinct values (we can discretize U andW in a coherent
way to achieve this). Here, we pay a factor of ℓ in the running time and the space comlexity
compared to the algorithm in Section 4 because of the exhaustive enumeration regarding ℓ. We
have the following analogous performance bound:
Corollary G.2. Let δ be an arbitrarily small constant. By setting ǫ = cL2τ2/δ2 for some constant
c, our algorithm gives gˆ0(S0) such that g0(S0)− δS0 ≤ gˆ0(S0) ≤ g0(S0).
Proof. The proof can be adapted easily from that of Theorem 4.3, hence we shall highlight the main
steps here. First, we extend, in a straightforward manner, the argument in Lemma 4.1 to prove that
gt(x, ℓ) is Lipschitz continuous for any t ∈ [τ ] and ℓ. Next, the same binding constraint argument
as in Lemma 4.2 will reveal that 0 ≤ gt(x, ℓ) − gmt (x, ℓ) ≤
√
2Lmax{gt(x, ℓ), gt(x, ℓ− 1)}Sǫ + Lxǫ
for any t and ℓ, where for convenience we use the convention that gt(x,−1) = gt(S, 0). Then,
since gt(x, ℓ) ≤ Lx for any ℓ by an argument similar to Lemma 4.1, we can use the “artificial”
probabilistic machinery to arrive at the conclusion.
H Hardness results
H.1 Computational lower bound: #P -hard result for non-uniform uncertainty
sets
This section proves that the problem of exactly computing the price upper bound is #P -hard for
non-uniform uncertainty sets, even when the payoff function is convex.
We reduce our problem from the counting subset sum problem. Let A = {a1, ..., aτ} be a set of
positive integers. The counting problem here is to count the number of subsets T ⊆ A such that
the sum of integers in T equals to b. This problem is known to be #P -hard [14].
We use a Cook-Reduction (see e.g., Chapter 17 in [5]) and our reduction proceeds as follows.
Given a counting subset sum instance {A, b}, we construct the price upper bound for a τ -round
European option hedging game such that the uncertainty set Ui at the i-th round is [−ζ i, ζ i], where
ζ
i
= ζi =
eai−1
eai+1 . The payoff function is the ordinary call option with strike K, i.e., g(x) = (x−K)+.
Since the payoff is convex, the optimal risk-neutral probability measure only has uniform probability
mass on {−ζ
i
, ζ i} at each round, i.e., the price moves up by a factor (1 + ζi) with probability 12
and moves down by a factor (1− ζ
i
) with probability 12 for each round.
Let P ∗ be this optimal probability measure. We next build a natural coupling between sampling
a subset T ⊆ A and moving a price trajectory in the binomial tree: an element ai ∈ T if and only if
the price trajectory moves up at the i-th round. Under this probability measure, the total number
of subsets T in which the elements sum up to b is
2τ Pr
T←P ∗
[
∑
ai∈T
ai = b].
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We next express the probability PrT←P ∗[
∑
ai∈T
ai = b] in terms of option prices. When T is
sampled from P ∗, the coupled trajectory’s final price is
S0
∏
ai∈T
(1 + ζ i)
∏
ai /∈T
(1− ζ
i
) = S0
∏
ai∈A
2
eai + 1
∏
ai∈T
eai = S0
∏
ai∈A
2
eai + 1
exp

∑
ai∈T
ai

 .
Let C =∏ai∈A 2eai+1 . We can see from the above equation that
Pr
T←P ∗
[
∑
ai∈T
ai = b] = Pr
P ∗
[Sτ = S0C exp(b)].
Let us consider options with three different strike prices K1 = S0C exp(b− 1), K2 = S0C exp(b),
and K3 = S0C exp(b+1). Let their corresponding prices be V1, V2, and V3. We can compute V1 as
follows:
V1 =
∫
(Sτ −K)+dP ∗ =
∑
j≥b
Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai = j](S0C exp(j) −K1).
Similarly, we have
V2 =
∑
j≥b+1
Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai = j](S0C exp(j)−K2),
and
V3 =
∑
j≥b+2
Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai = j](S0C exp(j)−K3).
From the above equalities, we have
V1 − V2 = Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai ≥ b]S0C(exp(b)− exp(b− 1))
V2 − V3 = Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai ≥ b+ 1]S0C(exp(b+ 1)− exp(b)).
Therefore, we have
Pr[
∑
ai∈T
ai = b] =
V1 − V2
S0C(exp(b)− exp(b− 1)) −
V2 − V3
S0C(exp(b+ 1)− exp(b)) ,
which completes our reduction.
H.2 Information theoretic lower bound: additive dependencies on S0
We now present a lower bound under the oracle model to justify the necessity of our algorithm’s
additive dependency on the stock’s initial price S0 and the Lipschitz parameter L, even for a single-
round model. Specifically, we shall show that in a single-round hedging game, if the number of
queries to the oracle is b, then there exists two payoff functions g(x) and h(x) such that:
1. Both functions are monotonic, L-Lipschitz, and have the same values at the queried points.
2. There exists an S0 such that the difference between the price upper bounds at S0 for the
functions is Θ(LS0/b).
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In other words, so long as the number of queries is only polynomial in τ , there will be an additive
error that is linear in S0 and L.
We now explain our construction. Let u be the size of the uncertainty set. Let the query points
be q1 < q2 < ... < qi < 0 < ... < qb, where qb − q1 ≤ u. For expositional purpose, let us assume
there are at least two queried points on the negative axis. Also, let us assume U is symmetric, i.e.,
U = [−u2 , u2 ]. Both assumptions can easily be relaxed.
By using an averaging argument, we see that there exists i and j such that (qi < 0 and qi−qi−1 ≥
u
2b) and (qj > 0 and qj+1 − qj ≥ u2b). Now we define g(x) and h(x) as follows:
Definition of g(x): Let C be a sufficiently large number, e.g., C = (1 + 100u)S0.
g(x) =
{
Lx
2 x ≤ C
Lx x > C.
(55)
Definition of h(x): Let I1 = [(1 + qi−1)S0, (1 + qi)S0] and I2 = [(1 + qj)S0, (1 + qj+1)S0].
h(x) =


g(x) x /∈ I1, I2.
Lx x ∈ [(1 + qi−1)S0, (1 + qi−1+qi2 )S0]
L(1 + qi)S0/2 x ∈ [(1 + qi−1+qi2 )S0, (1 + qi)S0]
Lx x ∈ [(1 + qj)S0, (1 + qj+qj+12 )S0]
L(1 + qj+1)S0/2 x ∈ [(1 + qj+qj+12 )S0, (1 + qj+1)S0].
(56)
We can see that the price upper bound for g(S0) in this single-round model is LS0/2. For h(x),
we can see that in the dual characterization of its optimal solution, the corresponding risk-neutral
measure has probability masses only at r1 ,
qi+qi−1
2 and r2 ,
qj+1+qj
2 . Thus, the price upper bound
for h(S0) is at least S0(
L
2 +
uL
2b ), which completes our argument.
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